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After a partial boycott of Japanese goods and products 
in China immediately after the Sino-Japanese diplomatic 
crisis broke out in September 2012, trade relations have 
recovered in the first quarter of this year. Late last year, 
when anti-Japan demonstrations in China, some of which 
culminated in violence, cast doubts upon the sustain-
ability of Japanese investments and production in China, 
Japanese carmakers and electronic companies feared that 
they would have to shift production out of China. Concerns 
in this respect have much reduced now, six months later. 
 From September to December 2012, Japanese inves-
tors in general and carmakers in particular felt the im-
pact of the bilateral political crisis. Toyota’s sales fell by 
about 30 per cent in a few weeks and while Japanese au-
tomakers’ share on the Chinese market accounted for 23 
per cent in September 2012, it dropped to 14 per cent in 
two following months. Toyota, however, is confident that 
it will not only return to pre-crisis sales but even expects 
this year's car sales in China to exceed the previous 
year's. While Toyota announced earlier this year that its 
Japan and China trade a lot between each other. Unfortunately, however, they 
also argue a lot with each other. Since Tokyo’s purchase of three uninhabited 
Japanese-controlled islets in the East China Sea from their private owner in 
September 2012, the main subject of dispute has been that of sovereignty 
over maritime territories. While bilateral trade amounted to an impressive 
$ 333 billion in 2012 (slightly less than in 2011, when bilateral trade reached 
$ 345 billion), a bilateral territorial dispute over control and sovereignty of 
what Tokyo calls Senkaku and Beijing calls the Diaoyu Islands will most prob-
ably continue to remain at the very top of the agenda of Sino-Japanese rela-
tions in the months ahead. 
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quently, the Japanese prime minister decided to buy those 
islands for the purpose of “maintaining those islands in 
a calm and stable manner”, as he put it. That message, 
however, did not reach Beijing, which arguably only heard 
what it wanted to hear. Indeed, from a Chinese perspec-
tive it was completely irrelevant who in Japan bought the 
islands – the purchase was a change to the previous status 
quo as far as Beijing’s leadership was concerned. 
 Indeed, what came after the purchase of the islands 
was everything but calm and stable. Interpreting the Jap-
anese government’s decision to purchase the islands as a 
unilateral change to the status quo, China turned to seek-
ing to change the territorial status quo in the waters and 
airspace around and above the Senkaku /Diaoyu Islands. 
In addition to increasing the number of naval law enforce-
ment patrols close to or in Japanese-controlled waters, 
Chinese reconnaissance planes repeatedly intruded into 
Japanese-controlled airspace (where they were at least 
once scrambled by Japanese F-15 fighter jets). On January 
30th, 2013, Japan and China came fairly close to a military 
clash when a Chinese naval frigate directed weapons-
targeting radar at a Japanese destroyer in waters off the 
disputed islands – a move typically considered to be one 
step away from opening fire. 
Japan Controls Them, 
China Wants Them (Back)
While Beijing’s territorial claims to the islands go back 
to the 14th century, Japan – with an interruption from 
1945 – 1972 – has controlled the Senkaku /Diaoyu Is-
lands since 1895 after its victory over China in the 
1894 – 1895 Sino-Japanese war and the adoption of the 
Treaty of Shimonoseki. Although the Treaty of Shimono-
seki did not specifically mention the Senkaku /Diaoyu 
islets, Beijing argues today that they were ceded to Japan 
as part of Taiwanese territory in 1895. Consequently Ja-
pan was – at least from a Chinese perspective – obliged 
to return the islands to China when Tokyo ceded sover-
sales in China had recovered to 84 per cent of the pre-
crisis level, the carmaker expects to sell 900,000 cars in 
China in 2013. This would pass the mark of its best-ever 
annual sales of 890,000 units.
 The Sino-Japanese crisis certainly is far from over and 
there is a near-consensus amongst analysts that inability 
of Japan and China to let political common sense and di-
plomacy prevail over nationalism and historical revision-
ism may easily result in another September 2012-style 
boycott of Japanese products at any time in the months 
ahead. This time around, however, Japanese investors in 
China are probably better prepared to deal with the con-
sequences of intensifying bilateral political tension. Japa-
nese investors have learned their lesson from the over-
exposure to the Chinese market and are accelerating a 
diversification of their investment strategies in Asia in 
general and Southeast Asia in particular. 
Japan Buys, China Gets Angry
On September 11th, 2012, the Japanese government, led by 
prime minister Yoshihiko Noda at the time, bought three 
of the islands under dispute (Minami-Kojima, Kita-ojima, 
and Uotsuri islands) from their private owner for roughly 
$ 26 million. Although Beijing begs to differ (very strong-
ly), Noda maintained at the time that the purchase did not 
change but instead maintained the status quo after Tokyo’s 
nationalist and China-bashing former governor Shintaro 
Ishihara announced to purchase the islands on behalf of 
Tokyo’s municipal government earlier in 2012. Ishihara, a 
politician infamous for his track record of white-washing 
Japanese World War II imperialism, hardcore nationalism 
and inflammatory anti-China rhetoric announced to de-
ploy personnel to the islands and build a small port and 
other facilities there. Japan’s official position is not to al-
low anybody – neither private citizens nor government 
officials – to set foot on the islands and Noda feared that 
allowing Ishihara to buy the islands would have further 
worsened the already tense bilateral relations. Conse-
3the adoption of the treaty. China further maintains that 
the Potsdam Declaration (July 26th, 1945) obliged Japan to 
renounce control of all islands it had annexed in the 19th 
and 20th century, including the Senkaku /Diaoyu Islands. 
Tokyo disagrees, pointing out that neither the Potsdam 
Declaration nor the San Francisco Peace Treaty specifi-
cally mention the islands. 
 Article 3 of the San Francisco Peace Treaty then put 
the disputed islands under the administration of the Unit-
eignty over Taiwan back to China through its signature 
of the 1951 San Francisco Peace Treaty. 
 Japan, on the other hand, argues that the islands were 
what international law calls “terra nullius”, i.e. territory 
over which sovereignty was never claimed by a state, 
in 1895. According to Japan, the islands did not belong 
to Taiwan and were hence not ceded to Japan under the 
Treaty of Shimonoseki. Instead, Japan incorporated them 
into Japanese territory as “terra nullius” months before 
Figure 1: Disputed Islands
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sical in light of the historical evidence.” Tokyo, however, 
he adds, “is nonetheless prepared to let the International 
Court of Justice (ICJ) rule on the dispute. Given that Japan 
already controls and administrates the islands, it does 
not have to ask for ICJ arbitration. Normally those who 
want to regain control and change the status quo should 
go to the ICJ first.” 
… and “Core Interests” for Beijing
China’s new leadership under Xi Jinping, of course, won’t 
do that and instead has turned to referring to the disputed 
islands as belonging to what Beijing calls China’s “core 
interests”. “Core interests” describe issues related to na-
tional sovereignty and territorial integrity over which Bei-
jing is (very) determined not to compromise over. While 
this term has typically been used in reference to Taiwan, 
Tibet and the Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region in the 
past, disputed territories in the South China and East 
China Sea are now also territories China is determined to 
defend under all circumstances. 
 “China’s ‘core interests’ are more important than any-
thing else,” Zhang confirms. “China’s leadership feels that 
it can continue to put pressure on the Japanese govern-
ment through intrusions into Japan-controlled territorial 
waters,” he says, adding that Xi is de facto obliged to opt 
for hard-line policies on territorial disputes. “Xi Jinping 
cannot appear to be weaker than his predecessor Hu Jintao 
where the territorial disputes are concerned, especially 
considering that his power base in the party is not as con-
solidated yet.” 
 Others in China deny that Chinese assertiveness on 
disputed territories in the South and East China Seas is 
a result of China’s leadership transition. “I do not buy 
into the speculation that the new leadership needs to ex-
hibit assertiveness to prove its legitimacy or secure its 
power base. Contrary to what outsiders may think, the 
government is trying to calm, not to inflame, the Chinese 
ed States as part of the Ryukyu Islands (also referred to 
as Nansei Shoto Islands). The United States administrated 
the islands as part of the United States Civil Administra-
tion of the Ryukyu Islands from 1945 to 1972, when Wash-
ington reverted the islands to Japanese control under the 
US-Japan Okinawa Reversion Treaty of 1971. While China 
maintains that the disputed islands do not even belong to 
the Ryukyu Islands today, it did not express any objections 
to the disputed islands’ status of being under US adminis-
tration from 1945 – 1972.
No Compromise in Tokyo … 
Japan’s prime minister Shinzo Abe is – due to his natio-
nalist and at times historical revisionist track record, revi-
siting Japan’s aggressive and imperialist behavior during 
World War II – arguably not the most suitable politician in 
charge to deal with the bilateral territorial dispute calmly. 
Japan’s business elites have actually urged Abe and like-
minded nationalists in his cabinet to suppress their na-
tionalist instincts and take Japanese business interests in 
China into account several times in the last six months. 
 Such a reminder to Japan’s leaders seemed necessary 
as Abe did not only limit himself to refer to Japanese con-
trol and sovereignty over the disputed islands as “non-
negotiable”, but also flirted with the idea of deploying 
government officials to the islands. While Japan insists 
that there is no territorial dispute with China in the East 
China Sea to begin with, Beijing wants Tokyo to reconsid-
er. “Beijing wants Tokyo to back off and admit that there 
is disputed territory with Japan,” Tiejun Zhang, Associate 
Senior Researcher at the Centre of Non-Traditional Secu-
rity at Zhejiang University in China points out.1 
 Which, as a Japanese analyst confirms, is what Japan 
will not do.2 “The government will never acknowledge 
the existence of a territorial dispute over the Senkaku 
Islands with China and will not negotiate on sovereignty 
over them. China’s territorial claims are almost nonsen-
1 In an interview with the author on May 19th, 2013.
2 In interview with the author on May 15th, 2013. The scholar – in view of his affiliation 
 and his institute’s close links with a government ministry – requested not to be identified. 
5violating Japanese territorial waters, a Japanese analyst 
says in an interview with the author5, is certainly becom-
ing increasingly difficult. “The mission of defending the 
Senkaku Islands is very demanding and we are seriously 
concerned about how long the country’s coast guard and 
Japan’s Maritime Self-Defense Forces (JMSDF) can keep 
the current operational tempo around the islands.”
Win-Win Business Ties
In sharp contrast to the tense political and diplomatic ties, 
trade and investment relations are soaring in spite of the 
setback late last year. Bilateral Japanese-Chinese trade 
has more than tripled over the past decade, making China 
Japan’s largest trading partner now, accounting for 21 per 
cent of Japan’s exports and imports.
 Japanese investments in China are more than twice 
the combined investments of the US and South Korea in 
China. According to recent data from the Japan External 
Trade Organization (JETRO), Japanese exports to China 
fell for the first time since 2009 in 2012, dropping by 10 
per cent to $ 144.7 billion. Japanese imports from China 
on the other hand increased by 3 per cent to $ 188.9 bil-
lion. While the bilateral trade volume dropped to $ 333.6 
billion in 2012 (down from $ 345 billion in 2011), JETRO 
expects exports to China to grow in single percentage 
digits while it forecasts a 10 per cent growth in imports 
from China. The $ 345 billion in bilateral trade in 2011 
amounted to 9 per cent of China’s overall trade and was 
more than China traded with Brazil, India, Russia and 
South Africa and Britain combined. 
 Japanese companies have made foreign direct invest-
ments in China amounting to $ 12 billion in 2011 accord-
ing to Japanese data (data from non-Japanese sources put 
the number of Japanese investments in China at $ 6 – 7 bil-
lion). Since 1996, Japan has accumulated $ 83 billion in 
investments in China. According to Keidanren, Japan's 
biggest business association, roughly 30,000 Japanese 
people’s nationalism,” a Chinese scholar3 tells the author 
in an interview. Then again, he adds: “While a military 
solution to territorial disputes is only China’s last resort, 
China will not accept to be indefinitely pushed around by 
its smaller neighbors.” As long as Beijing does not con-
sider deploying armed forces to deal with the territorial 
dispute,” however, a military conflict with Japan over the 
disputed islands remains unlikely,” he concludes. 
“Dual Control” Chinese-style
While Japan (and admittedly many others in Asia, too) 
considers Chinese intrusions into waters controlled by 
it as evidence that China is using its growing military 
power to claim disputed territories all over Asia, Beijing 
continues to argue that there isn’t anything wrong with 
intruding into Japanese-controlled territorial waters as 
Chinese Lieutenant General Qi Jianguo, deputy chief 
of general staff of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) 
confirms during the annual Shangri-La Asian Security 
Summit in Singapore in June: “Our attitude on the East 
and South China Seas is that they are defending Chi-
nese sovereignty. Chinese warships patrolling the South 
China Sea and East China Sea is entirely legitimate and 
uncontroversial.”
 These patrols and violations of Japanese-controlled 
waters have – at least from a Chinese perspective – be-
come effective. “China has successfully transformed 
Japan’s “nationalization” of the three islands into an op-
portunity to gain actual control over the Diaoyu Islands, 
making “dual control” over the islands the new reality,” 
a Chinese scholar4 tells the author in an interview. From 
a non-Chinese perspective, this is arguably a legally and 
politically highly questionable approach: Intruding into 
waters controlled by another country and labeling such 
intrusions ”dual control” has not been acknowledged as 
such outside of Chinese policy-making circles, let alone 
in Japan, since 1895. Deterring Chinese vessels from 
3 Who requested not to be identified by name.
4 Who requested not to be identified by name.
5 An analyst with close links to a government ministry and requested not to be identified by name.
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nese products as well. Most of Japanese products are pro-
duced and assembled by Chinese-owned companies with 
local labor and materials. 
 Japan and China hold complementary roles in the 
east Asian production network: while China is the leader 
of Asia’s assembly and production network, a great many 
components of advanced technologies are imported from Ja-
pan. The Japanese-Chinese complementarity is, of course, 
limited as China is improving its ability to operate in the 
high(er) ends of the technology spectrum as well. Rising 
Chinese wages, the (yet relatively slow) appreciation of the 
renminbi and a shrinking labor force have obliged Chinese 
companies to compete at the higher end of the value chain. 
Furthermore, massive investments into the country’s in-
companies are operating and investing in China, em-
ploying 10 million Chinese workers. Chinese outward 
investments into Japan, on the other hand, are yet very 
modest and have amounted to $ 560 million in 2011. In 
comparison, US companies have invested $ 70 billion, and 
EU companies $ 94 billion in Japan in the same year. 
 
Partners and Competitors
While Japanese brands and products are highly visible on 
China’s domestic market, Chinese consumers have prov-
en late last year that they are prepared to shun Japanese 
brands as an expression of what the authorities referred 
as Chinese ‘patriotism’ back then. To be sure, China has 
much to lose from a September 2012-style boycott of Japa-
Source: Japan External Trade Organization (JETRO)
Figure 2: Japan’s exports to major markets
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7during structural problem, one that goes beyond nation-
alist disturbances or political transitions in China and 
Japan,” Green concludes. 
 As for the good news, China and Japan have agreed to 
seek to start negotiating a bilateral free trade agreement 
despite the on-going territorial conflict earlier this year. 
However, there is probably next to no doubt that the terri-
torial dispute will affect the speed with which Tokyo and 
Beijing will actually be able to adopt such an agreement. 
 Before nationalism and historical revisionism made 
unhelpful comebacks on Japan’s and China’s respective 
domestic policy agendas, Tokyo and Beijing had some con-
structive ideas on how to deal with the territorial dispute. 
In 2008, Tokyo and Beijing signed a memorandum of un-
derstanding envisioning the joint exploration of natural 
resources in the East China Sea – an attempt at adopting 
what was referred to as 'functional cooperation' while (si-
lently) agreeing to disagree on whom the islands belong 
to. Such 'functional cooperation', however, is currently ev-
erything but completely off the bilateral agenda. 
 In view of the de facto refusal in both Tokyo and Bei-
jing to talk to as opposed to about each other regarding 
the disputed islands, they are advised to focus on what 
they do best: trade bilaterally while ordering their re-
spective coast guards and navies to limit themselves to 
‘observing’ each other in the East China Sea. 
frastructure and technological capacities have enabled 
Chinese companies to strengthen their position in more 
skill-intensive industries. 
 While China is on its way to establishing itself more 
and more as an economic competitor of Japan, both coun-
tries are already competing globally for access to resourc-
es ranging from hydrocarbons to base metals. Finally, 
China’s near-monopoly global position in rare earths, vi-
tal to Japan’s more sophisticated production lines, makes 
Japan economically very vulnerable to an interruption of 
Chinese rare earth exports. 
 
What next?
The bilateral territorial dispute is arguably an enormous 
waste of time and resources, potentially jeopardizing mu-
tually beneficial and profitable trade and business rela-
tions. For the time being, Beijing seems to feel strong and 
invulnerable enough to defend its “core interests” and let 
political and economic common sense dominate its de-
cisions related to the territorial dispute with Japan that 
started 118 years ago. 
 Although Beijing thinks it has already established 
“dual control” in disputed waters in the East China, Chi-
nese intrusions into Japanese-controlled waters do in 
reality not change the actual control over the disputed 
islands and the waters surrounding them. Unless, of 
course, the Chinese military gets the go-ahead to take 
over and (mis)manage the conflict to establish the above-
mentioned “dual control” or worse – from a Japanese per-
spective – “exclusive control” through military force. 
 The territorial dispute certainly is not only about 
nationalism and transition of leadership in Japan and 
China, says US Japan scholar Michael Green in an in-
terview with the Financial Times: “About 90 per cent of 
Japanese and Chinese oil and gas is shipped through 
those waters, while dominance above the sea helps both 
sides map the topography beneath the sea for submarine 
warfare. That makes the Senkaku Islands dispute an en-
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